Abstract. In a paper of 1933 Godel proved that every satisfiable first-order V2?3* sentence has a finite model. Actually he constructed a finite model in an ingenious and sophisticated way. In this paper we use a simple and straightforward probabilistic argument to establish existence of a finite model of an arbitrary satisfiable V123* sentence.
?0. Introduction. We consider the usual first-order logic of textbooks. A firstorder formula is called a sentence if it has no free individual variables. In this paper we restrict our attention to formulas without function symbols or individual constants. Unless we explicitly note otherwise, our formulas are without occurrences of equality. THEOREM 1. Let q=VVNVV2HV3... 3 v1q(vj, ..., v1) where 0i is quantifier free. If 5 has a model it has afinite model. [3] . It was proved independently in Schiitte [9] , [10]. Gddel's proof is much cleaner and easier than that of Schiitte. Still it is very sophisticated. Its overall scheme is simple, however. Gbdel formulates a syntactical criterion and proves that the criterion is necessary for satisfiability and sufficient for finite satisfiability. It is the proof of sufficiency that is difficult. In ?1 we give the simple part of Gddel's proof. In ?2 we define random finite structures and prove the sufficiency result in a straightforward way. Let us mention that the idea of random structures is not a perfect novelty: see Fagin [2] .
Theorem 1 was proved in Gddel
COROLLARY. There is an algorithm that decides satisfiability of V23* sentences.
The Corollary was independently proved in Kalmar [6] . When our proof gives an easier proof of Theorem 1, G6del's proof gives a better upper bound on the size of a minimal model of q5. Additional information about models of V23* sentences can be found in Dreben and Goldfarb [1] . Lewis [8] gives lower and upper bounds on the computational complexity of algorithms that decide satisfiability of V23* sentences.
Both Theorem 1 and the Corollary are easily generalized to 3*V23* sentences, which form one of the maximal decidable for satisfiability classes of prenex sentences that is defined by type of prefix; see Lewis [7] . Even the V33 [4] showed that there is no primitive recursive procedure that decides satisfiability of V23 sentences with equality and at most binary predicates. The reader may wonder where the proof of Theorem 1 breaks down in the case with equality. An answer can be found in ?4.
More about the Gddel class with equality will appear in Goldfarb, Gurevich and Shelah [5] .
We thank Warren Goldfarb for useful comments on a draft of this paper. R(al, ..., aj) In order to improve our bound we can be more cautious in defining a random structure M. In particular we can be more restrictive in defining k-place predicates for k ? 3. A real sophistication is needed, however, to get Godel's bound. ?4. A note on equality. As we mentioned in ?0, it is still unknown whether every satisfiable dyadic V23 sentence with equality has a finite model. Why is equality so important? Where did we use the fact that equality does not appear in q?
The situation appears to be even more intriguing if one notices that we do ensure in the proof of Theorem 2 that the desired witnesses a3, . . ., a, are different between themselves and different from a1, a2. Moreover, the proof of Theorem 2 does not use absence of equality at all. However, absence of equality was used in ?1 to prove necessity of (G1). DEFINITION See also Goldfarb, Gurevich and Shelah [5] .
